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Abstract
Suppose we were in 2028: what would the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) look like then? Would it be significantly dif-
ferent from the policy we know today? How, and why? And to what extent would Brexit have catalyzed these changes? The
CAP is one of the founding policies of the EU and a strategic lever to address critical 21st century challenges such as climate
change and the rising demand for food at the global level. It also has an important role in Europe to address the growing
urban-rural divide and its potentially destabilizing impact on European politics. In this article, we examine the impact of
Brexit from a political-economic perspective emphasizing themulti-level context within which the CAP is embedded. As an
EU member state, the UK found a way to partly accommodate the CAP to its needs even though this policy was a source
of intense UK dissatisfaction with the EU. Post-Brexit, the budgetary and market implications of the UK’s departure may
favour positions that support a return to amore traditional policy of farm income support. On the other hand, more radical
farm policies in England andWales could partly offset these effects by setting the agenda for continued CAP reform, if they
are seen to be successful.
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1. Introduction
There is an irony in reflecting about the impact of
Brexit on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Both
the CAP and the UK are ‘pivotal outliers’. On the one
hand, the UK is the powerful but reluctant Member
State (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2019)—at once, one of
the largest economies in the EU and one of the Member
States with themost EU Treaty exemptions. On the other
hand, the CAP is an exceptional policy of redistribution,
making up a large share of the EU budget in an EU po-
litical system operating by default through regulatory in-
tervention; and home to major EU legal and institutional
innovations (e.g., comitology and jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice in the 1960s and 1970s). Taken
together, these two pivotal outliers arguably embrace
one of the most problematic aspects in the evolution of
EU policies. Agricultural policy was one of the main rea-
sons why French President de Gaulle twice vetoed a UK
membership application, and why the UK fought for a
budget rebate. The bones of contention were rooted in
the relative unimportance of farming in theUK compared
to continental European countries, but also to different
approaches to farm support (price guarantees vs pay-
ments), Britain’s long-standing liberal tradition in trade,
and competition from Commonwealth products. Over
time, additional sources of tension included the EU bud-
get, from which the UK benefitted little and to which it
contributed much, and a range of new concerns, includ-
ing the environment, animal welfare, and consumer pro-
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tection. Today, freedom from the CAP’s ‘yoke’ has been
one of the main withdrawal gains coveted by Brexiteers,
hard and soft.
Pursuing this theme of antagonism between two piv-
otal outliers,we ask:what has Britishmembershipmeant
for the CAP? And how and why might Brexit affect the
CAP? A policy in flux since the late 1980s, the CAP is now
in themidst of a new round of reform, taking place in par-
allel with negotiations on the renewal of the EU’s long-
term budget framework (the so-called multi-annual fi-
nancial framework [MFF] 2021–2027). As observers have
noted, the history of the CAP shows ‘a shift from ‘sim-
ply’ supporting farmers to paying farmers for the deliv-
ery of environmental and other non-market goods and
services, and towards more general rural development’
(Harvey, 2015). The farm income support objective re-
mains the dominant one, although the mechanism of
this support has altered over time and is now delivered
largely through decoupled direct payments. However,
the legitimacy of these direct payments as well as their
effectiveness in delivering income support remains con-
tested (Buckwell, 2017; Harvey, 2015). Efforts have been
made to justify these payments as compensating farm-
ers for environmental conservation efforts, given the link
through cross-compliance and, more recently, the green-
ing payment which absorbs 30% of the direct payments
budget. Additional payments are provided to farmers
through the CAP’s rural development pillar to farmers
who voluntarily agree to adopt practices favourable for
the environment and climate stabilization that go be-
yond these mandatory baselines. However, these mea-
sures have failed to reverse the negative environmental
consequences of EU farming practices (Pe’er et al., 2017).
Thus, the future direction in which the CAP should
go remains a highly contested issue (Mottershead et al.,
2018). Faced with the certainty of a significant Brexit
budget hole, the Commission proposals both highlight
the need for a greater level of environmental and cli-
mate ambition in the light of the EU’s commitments to
the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) including
the Paris Agreement on climate change and target the
more environmentally-friendly part of the CAP for bud-
get cuts. Member States have been focused on simplifi-
cation and the preservation of their ‘national envelopes’
tied to farm payments. Farm unions and their advocates
in the European Parliament’s (EP) agriculture committee
have insisted on the need tomaintain the level of income
support and seek stronger market regulation and protec-
tion against market crises. In sum, the future of the CAP
remains shrouded in ambiguities and contradictions.
What Brexit means for the future of debates around
these issues in the CAP remains a largely unexplored
question. The sparse literature on this topic highlights
the potentially large impact of Brexit for the CAP,
mainly owing to the implications of the ‘Brexit-sized
hole in the EU budget’ and the weakening of the
liberal-environmental coalition in the Council (EP, 2017;
Matthews, 2016). Taking this argument one step further,
we examine in this article not only the effects of Brexit
that are directly related to the ‘withdrawal factor’ it-
self, but also those that are related to the responses
and adjustments of EU actors and institutions (De Ville
& Siles-Brügge, 2019). Using this framework, our article
shows how changing interactions between the domestic,
European, and international arenas have affected oppor-
tunities for UK agency in the CAP (Section 2); how the UK
exploited these opportunities in the CAP reforms of the
last two decades (Section 3); and finally, how the lessons
of history can help us to predict how the CAP might re-
spond to Brexit in the future (Section 4).
2. Three Eras of CAP Governance and Growing
Opportunities for UK Revisionism
What we call the CAP is in fact a patchwork of policies,
focusing primarily on the farming component of agri-
culture, which are tied to multiple arenas of decision-
making: the domestic arena, the EC–EU arena, and the
international arena (Roederer-Rynning, 2019). Thismulti-
level construction has been a source of ‘institutional dy-
namism’ (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992) over time. Follow-
ing the formative years of the early 1960s, we distin-
guish three main CAP eras, each characterized by a dif-
ferent mix of domestic—European supranational—and
international policy elements. In this section, we briefly
present these three eras with a view to outlining the
historically changing set of political opportunities for UK
CAP revisionism.
CAP 1.0 (1964–1985) corresponds to the era of em-
bedded liberalism. This expression comes from the in-
ternational political economy literature, where it refers
to the postwar economic order that flourished under
the umbrella of the multilateral Bretton Woods institu-
tions (Ruggie, 1982; Steinberg, 2006). Embedded liberal-
ism epitomized a balancing act between economic liber-
alism and social welfare. In European agricultural affairs,
this period marked the development and consolidation
of a policy regimewhich was both strongly Europeanized
in its policy dimension while deeply rooted in domes-
tic politics (Daugbjerg & Roederer-Rynning, 2014). It has
been argued that the founding negotiations on this first
CAP regime were fast-tracked in 1961 in order to reach
an agreement before taking position on the first UK
application for membership. Thus according to Ackrill
(2000, p. 33):
The French did not want to open these [UK accession]
negotiations until the CAP had been shaped, as they
feared the UK would try to mould the CAP in line with
their existing policy of low prices and direct payments
to farmers, rather than the ‘Continental’ high-priced
model.
When theUK joined the Community in 1973, the CAPwas
fully shaped, it was highly protectionist, and it centered
on a systemof (high) price support. This CAPwas a source
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ofmultiple and intense grievances for the UK, which ben-
efitted little from farm support while contributing a dis-
proportionate share to the EC budget mostly spent on
farm support.
CAP 2.0 (1986–2008) marked the internationaliza-
tion of CAP governance. For the first time, the liberal-
ization of agricultural trade became a top priority of
international trade negotiators in the Uruguay round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT;
Daugbjerg & Swinbank, 2009). This context facilitated
the adoption of the MacSharry reform of 1992, which
marked the shift from traditional price support to farm
payments. With the subsequent Fischler reform of June
2003 and Health Check of the CAP of 2008, these farm
payments were further ‘decoupled’ from output and
made conditional upon social, economic, and environ-
mental criteria via the cross-compliance or conditional-
ity of farm payments. Further international pressures
for reform resulted from adverse rulings in the World
Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement process
(bananas, sugar) and from the priority of DG Trade under
Commissioner Pascal Lamy to provide duty-free quota-
free access to the EU market to least-developed coun-
tries (sugar, rice). Finally, Agenda 2000 and especially
the Fischler reform built an important element of flexible
implementation into the CAP. Flexible implementation
was later embedded in the Cioloş CAP reform of 2013,
through an expandedmenu of choices for the implemen-
tation of direct payments as well as the ‘greening pay-
ment’ introduced in this reform. Thus, CAP 2.0 offered
better opportunities for the UK to push a reform agenda.
The current phase of agricultural policy, CAP 3.0
(2009–now), is marked by a more politicized CAP. Higher
world prices following the 2008 world food crisis al-
lowed the EU to pursue a less defensive trade strat-
egy and facilitated the phasing out of export subsidies
on EU farm commodities. However, international trade
pressures, despite the failure of multilateral trade ne-
gotiations, continue to be a constraint because of bilat-
eral trade agreements. European ‘sensitive products’ like
beef, sugar, and poultry have been a sticking point in the
current negotiations between the EU and the Mercado
Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), composed of Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay. Likewise, the EU has defen-
sive agricultural interests in the bilateral negotiations
recently launched with Australia and New Zealand. Be-
sides international trade liberalization, two new sources
of politicization have emerged and gained importance
since 2009.
The first is the rapid rise of global concern over
climate change and the environmental agenda more
broadly. The farm and food sector features centrally
in the UN SDGs adopted in 2015 and in the Paris
Agreement on Climate Change adopted in 2016. The EU
has been at the forefront of these efforts, notably with
its ‘2030 Climate and Energy Framework’ adopted in
2014, and current proposals on a climate-neutral Europe
by 2050. Public interest in how food is produced has
exploded, highlighting issues such as natural resource
degradation, biodiversity loss, welfare issues around in-
tensive livestock production and the use of biotechnol-
ogy. These new priorities and demands for how the CAP
budget is spent have fuelled redistributive conflict at
a moment when Member States, following the EU en-
largement to the Central and East European countries
(CEECs), have engaged in an ever more intense compe-
tition for EU funding and sought to maintain tight inter-
governmental control over the financing of EU policies
(Matthews, 2015).
A second source of politicization has been the Treaty
of Lisbon, ratified in 2009. The Treaty brought the
ordinary legislative procedure to the CAP and abol-
ished the distinction between so-called ‘compulsory
expenditure’—in practice farm expenditure—lying out-
side of the purview of the EP and non-compulsory expen-
diture (where the EP had the last word). The Council of
Ministers has thus lost its legal preponderance in agricul-
tural policy and the role of the EP has been strengthened.
This ‘parliamentarization’ has politicized EP–Council rela-
tions in agriculture. Since 2009, the two have competed
to define the scope of EP powers in the CAP as in the
common commercial policy and in the MFF—all of these
aspects influencing the CAP and CAP reform. The UK
has never been an enthusiastic proponent of the devel-
opment of EP powers—preferring to stick to the classic
method of intergovernmentalism. Although often por-
trayed as a champion of diffuse interests, the EP played
a basically status quo-oriented role in the first CAP re-
form in 2013 after the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon
(Swinnen, 2015).
Overall, the thrust of the CAP evolution over the
last 60 years is to green farm support, push for more
trade liberalization, and place more emphasis on sustain-
ability (Roederer-Rynning, in press). For a member state
like the UK, championing trade liberalization (De Ville &
Siles-Brügge, 2019) and environmental protection and
climate action (Dupont & Moore, 2019), this has meant
better opportunities to shape the CAP to its advantage.
How did the UK exploit this context of growing politi-
cal opportunities?
3. Putting Membership to Use: From Doléances to
Budget Returns
(Self-)perceptions of UK influence in CAP policy-making
have long been shaped by a narrative of liberalism. Still
today, the UK distinguishes itself among the large Mem-
ber States by the ‘nearly exclusive emphasis on a neolib-
eral discourse’ (Alons & Zwaan, 2015, p. 364). Since the
1980s, British agricultural policy has given ‘priority to the
free functioning of the market, which plays in favour of
the comparative advantage of British agriculture, while
it recognizes market failure at valourising externalities’
(Garzon, 2006, p. 125). What exactly these ‘externalities’
are has evolved over time, from an early understanding
focused on environmental externalities towards, more
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recently, amore encompassing conception of rural devel-
opment. Garzon speaks of an ‘UK consensus’, which is ‘at
oddswith the “continental” vision ofmulti-functionality’:
for ‘to be acceptable to British policy makers, multifunc-
tionality ought to be focused on environmental outputs
and used as a discourse to explain a transition process’
(Garzon, 2006, p. 125; see also Delorme, 2004). How-
ever, this twofold orientation towards liberalization and
greening is not without ambiguities and trade-offs, as
evidenced by the nascent debate on a post-Brexit UK
agricultural policy. Before we examine the contemporary
Brexit debate, we explore in this section how the UK
brought this overarching liberal narrative to bear on the
CAP while a member of the EU, and what kind of trade-
offs and ambiguities it faced in the promotion of a lib-
eral CAP. We proceed by examining the role of the UK
in individual CAP reforms, before briefly extending the
analysis to other aspects of UK activism, including na-
tional implementation and a longstanding focus on bet-
ter regulation.Wedrawon various ‘insider’ sources (such
as Cunha& Swinbank’s 2011 detailed ‘insider’ account of
twodecades of CAP reforms; andGarzon’s 2006 account),
and supplementary secondary and primary sources.
The accession ‘cahier de doléances’: the UK’s early
membership was marked by vigorous skirmishes on the
CAP. In fact, barely two years after joining the Com-
munity, the UK held its first membership referendum,
throughwhich ‘theUK governmentwished to change the
CAP to its advantage’ (Ackrill, 2000, p. 52). Three points
stood out in the UK government’s accession doléances,
which reflected the outlying position of the UK, due to
historical reasons, in agricultural matters: 1) the UK’s ‘sta-
tus as a major importer of food’; 2) UK concerns over the
fate of Commonwealth agreements securing food for the
UK in exchange for assistance to Commonwealth produc-
ers; and 3) the UK’s status as a major net contributor to
the Community budget, behind Germany (Ackrill, 2000,
p. 52). A major implication of this structural mismatch
was that UK CAP revisionism was soon channeled out-
side of the CAP proper: i.e., in the larger intergovernmen-
tal budgetary battles, which culminated in a ‘UK budget
rebate’ under Prime Minister Thatcher. The budget com-
promises of the 1980s had no effects on the CAP’s pol-
icy design; they perhaps even contributed to sustaining
it in a sub-optimal form. The UK nevertheless won two
victories in this period: 1) the introduction of the Less
Favoured Areas directive in 1975, which allowed it to di-
rect support to its upland farms; and 2) the introduction
of agri-environment schemes, initially on a voluntary ba-
sis (Regulation [EEC] 797/85). At first, only the UK and
Germany made use of this voluntary option, but even-
tually Agricultural Environment and Climate Measures
(AECMs) became a mandatory component of the rural
development pillar of the CAP.
TheMacSharry reform (1992)—arguably the first and
most far-reaching CAP reform—found the UK in a para-
doxical position of opposition. Although the UK called for
a radical CAP reform in the context of the GATT nego-
tiations, it entered the MacSharry reform as the leader
of an opposition comprising the Netherlands, Belgium,
and Denmark (Cunha & Swinbank, 2011, p. 33; see also
Coleman et al., 1999, cited in Garzon, 2006, p. 67). The
most contentious issue was modulation, which in these
early years essentially meant capping direct payments as
a function of farm size. Fearing the impact of capping for
its larger farms, the UK minister explained in the Council
that he was ‘not prepared to buy a reform at the ex-
pense of turning Europe’s agriculture into a tourist at-
traction for peoplewho liked farming inMarie Antoinette
style’ (Cunha & Swinbank, 2011, p. 79). The UK also con-
ditioned its approval of CAP reform on guarantees that
its financial impact would lie within agreed budget lim-
its (Cunha & Swinbank, 2011, p. 85). Domestic politics
played a big role in shaping the UK’s initial position. The
UK parliamentary elections were held in the midst of the
CAP reform, during which the UK minister expressed his
opposition to theMacSharry reform (Cunha & Swinbank,
2011, pp. 83–84). The strategy of the Commission was
to divide the opposition by offering the UK concessions
(Cunha & Swinbank, 2011, pp. 95–96). This strategy was
fruitful. After being reelected, the UK minister ‘quickly
negotiated with the Presidency his conditions to support
the reform, and once these had been obtained in a sat-
isfactory way he was the first to leave his allies of yester-
day’ (Cunha & Swinbank, 2011, p. 33).
In the Agenda 2000 reform (1999), the multi-issue
negotiation package aimed at preparing the EU for the
Eastern enlargement, the tables had turned: the UK was
now in favor of a CAP reform, together with Denmark
and Sweden (Cunha & Swinbank, 2011, p. 108), eye-
ing in the enlargement an opportunity to overcome sta-
tus quo pressures. According to Ackrill (2000, p. 118)
these three countries ‘felt Agenda 2000 did not go far
enough’ and wished for more radical reforms. Although
the coalitions shifted from issue to issue, the reform was
shaped by intense overarching budget discussions, pit-
ting France (against any co-financing of the CAP) against
Germany, opposed to any suggestion of drastic price cuts
or ‘degressivity’, i.e., the reduction of direct payments
over time. The UK, like France, supported degressivity
(Ackrill, 2000, p. 129; Garzon, 2006, p. 84). In line with
its longstanding commitment to budget discipline, the
UK, together with Austria, Germany, the Netherlands,
and France, proposed the principle of ‘budget stabiliza-
tion’: thus, ‘it would be the finance ministers who de-
cided the financial scope of the CAP reform’ (Cunha &
Swinbank, 2011, p. 112). On substantive CAP issues, the
UK advocated the termination of dairy quotas, together
with Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden (Cunha &
Swinbank, 2011, p. 113; Garzon, 2006, p. 84). It also advo-
cated a stronger ‘second pillar’ of the CAP devoted to ru-
ral development (the pillar terminology was introduced
in the Agenda 2000) , together with Austria, Sweden,
Finland, Portugal, and ‘more cautiously, France’ (see also
Ackrill, 2000, p. 129). The UK’s approach was that, over
time, rural development should replace market support
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and farm payments (Cunha & Swinbank, 2011, p. 121).
Assessments of the reform stress that ‘the British gov-
ernment clearly chose the UK rebate over CAP reform’
(Cunha & Swinbank, 2011, p. 118; these authors refer to
Serger, 2001, Swinnen, 2008, and Tangermann, 1999). Ul-
timately, the reform introduced ‘voluntary modulation’,
i.e., the possibility for member-states to reallocate a
share of their direct payments (pillar one) towards ru-
ral development measures (pillar two). Opposition from
Germany and Spain explains that modulation remained
voluntary. Only the UK and France subsequently used
this option. As Garzon (2006, pp. 87–88) notes, ‘the
United Kingdom…saw this as a way to rebalance the CAP
to its advantage’.
In the Fischler reform of 2003, which is often consid-
ered to be of a magnitude similar to the MacSharry re-
form, the biggest change did not come from the UK but
from Germany, which had ‘transformed itself from an
obstructor into a partner of agricultural policy change’
(Garzon, 2006, p. 118). The shadow of enlargement
loomed large. On the one side, the UK, Sweden, the
Netherlands, and Germany feared that extending direct
payments to the new Member States would ‘perpetu-
ate the costly “compensatory” aid scheme, which they
tried to reduce’ (Garzon, 2006, p. 98). On the other side,
France argued that ‘if it was only the CAP that was to be
reformed, then this implied that France was paying for
enlargement (Greer, 2005, p. 150)’ (Cunha & Swinbank,
2011, p. 135). Germany’s realignment, and the continu-
ing pressure to make direct payments WTO-compatible
promoted ‘a more cohesive bargaining game’ (Garzon,
2006), even though the three big Member States contin-
ued to favor different options. For the UK, the priority,
again, was to avoid a capping of farm payments. The fact
that the capping of farm payments played such a promi-
nent role in the UK’s position can be surprising given that
this position partly contradicts the liberal narrative (large
farmers do not need subsidies) and de facto undercut
the greening of the CAP by reducing the funding avail-
able for environmental and rural developmentmeasures.
One of the key supporters of this official UK position was
the National Farmers’ Union (NFU; Delorme, 2004, cited
in Garzon, 2006, p. 89; Hennis, 2001; Lowe, Buller, &
Ward, 2002), which was squeezed between the Blair gov-
ernment’s lack of interest in agriculture and the rise of
the rural development movement. Realizing the lack of
popularity of direct payments in the public at large, the
NFU ‘chose to take part in the discussion [of the Agenda
2000 reform and subsequent reforms], with the support
of the Land Owners’ Association, in order to influence
it, notably by opposing the capping of individual receipts’
(Garzon, 2006, p. 89; added emphasis).
In the Health Check of the CAP (2007), the UK advo-
cated a much more radical reform than that envisioned
by Agriculture Commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel. Its
position was spelled out in a 2005 governmental docu-
ment authored by the UK Treasury and the Department
for Environment, Food, and Agriculture (Her Majesty’s
Treasury & Department of Environment, Food & Rural
Affairs, 2005). This document ‘reflected its [UK] tradi-
tional liberal standing’, advocating for a general retrench-
ment of public intervention in agriculture except for en-
vironmental purposes (Cunha & Swinbank, 2011, p. 190).
This vision had little appeal in the Council although it
might have contributed to upgrading the ambition of the
Health Check reform (Cunha & Swinbank, 2011, p. 183).
Remarkably, in the years preceding the second UK
referendum over continued membership, consensus re-
mained the norm in the Agriculture Council and the UK
had become part and parcel of it (see Table 1). More
than two-thirds (67,7%) of the decisions were adopted
by unanimity or quasi-unanimity (i.e., only one mem-
ber state abstaining or voting against). Although the CAP
had become one of the most contested policy areas in
the EU, Council decision-making remained largely con-
sensual even in that area (Hayes-Renshaw, Van Aken, &
Wallace, 2006). The UK was part of the majority in more
than 80% of the cases. While this was lower than France
and Italy who were always in the majority, it was the
same as Germany, which also voted in support of EU leg-
islation in 26 out of 31 cases in the 2009–2014 period.
Even more remarkably, perhaps, the UK did not push
back significantly on the last CAP reform before the UK
referendum: the Cioloș reform. This reform, adopted in
December 2013, was criticized for making too large con-
cessions to conservative agricultural interests, and pay-
ing only lip service to the environmental and rural dimen-
sion of the CAP. It caused an uproar among environmen-
tal NGOs based in the EU and the UK. However, unlike
Germany, the UK did not vote against any of the Cioloș
reform files.
CAP reform negotiations enable us to assess the UK’s
role in CAP reform decision-making. While important,
this dimension does not exhaust the repertoire of UK ac-
tivism as a member state. It should be supplemented by
a finer analysis of the UK implementation of the CAP. In-
deed, the UK has recently used the opportunities offered
by flexible implementation to make a partial transition to
a new type of agricultural policy. Agricultural policy is de-
volved in the UK: national implementation of the CAP is
undertaken by the agriculture departments of England,
Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales—under the lead
of Defra. Thus, there is no one model of UK implemen-
tation. However, the UK as a whole (with the limited ex-
ception of Scotland) has distinguished itself by the full de-
coupling of the single farm payments from 2005 (Greer,
2005).With the Cioloş reform, theUK confirmed its readi-
ness ‘to “wear” the new CAP with no transition’ (Henke
et al., 2018). In addition, while the UK had traditionally
paid ‘the lowest [rural development] grants and was for
many years the only country not to support the contin-
uation of organic production’ (Greer, 2005, p. 181), the
UK doubled rural development appropriations between
2013 and 2018 (from €2.580 billion in current prices to
€5.195 billion) by voluntarily modulating farm support
during the period.
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Table 1. Council voting results in agriculture (co-decision files), 2009–2014.
Council voting results,
agriculture, 2009–2014 Legislative files (#) Legislative files (details)
Voting results: 31
AT THE EU LEVEL
— unanimity 17
— unanimity minus one MS 4
— 20–26 MS support 10
AT THE UK LEVEL
—UK in support 26
— UK abstention 1 2014/0014 (COD): Aid scheme for the supply of fruit and
vegetables, bananas and milk in the educational establishments:
25 out of 28 member-states vote in support; Hungary and the
Netherlands vote against;
—UK not participating 1 2011/0281 (COD): Common organisation of the markets in
agricultural products 2014–2020. Single CMO Regulation: 26 out
of 28 member-states vote in support; Germany votes against
—UK against 3 2013/0398 (COD): Agricultural products on the internal market
and in third countries: information provision and promotion: 25
out of 28 member-states vote in support; the Netherlands and
Sweden also vote against
2010/0256 (COD): Outermost regions: specific measures for
agriculture: 25 out of 27 member-states vote in support; Sweden
also votes against
2008/0183 (COD): Food distribution to the most deprived
persons in the Community: 23 out of 27 member-states vote in
support; Denmark and Sweden also vote against; and 1 abstains
Note: The data are accessed from the EP Legislative Observatory at https://oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/home/home.do and the
Council of the European Union Online Document Register at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/register/en/content/int?typ=ADV.
Lastly, a final aspect in which the UK has sought
to change the CAP is through its longstanding commit-
ment to improving regulatory governance. This concern
dates back to the late 1980s, with the establishment of
a Deregulation Unit under the Thatcher government and
was further developed in the Better Regulation agenda
in the late 1990s and early 2000s, notably under Tony
Blair (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment, 2017). In agriculture, the main manifestation of
this growing concern was reflected:
• At the domestic level: through a practice of broad
and inclusive consultation of stakeholders in dis-
cussions of CAP reforms (Cunha & Swinbank, 2011,
p. 147; Greer, 2005, p. 179);
• At the EU level: through the push of the Better Reg-
ulation agenda in the CAP, involving rigorous inter-
service consultations and the systematic use of im-
pact assessments in the bigger CAP reforms, since
the reform of the sugar regime which took effect
in 2006.
In sum, as an EU member, the UK approached the
CAP from an overarching liberal orientation, which de-
livered a few environmental wins and surprising results,
such as the constant battle against the capping of di-
rect payments and the overriding concern for budget
rebates. Specific policy victories included the develop-
ment of measures on less-favored areas and of agri-
environmental schemes. The UK approached the liber-
alizing MacSharry reform in 1992 from such a posture
of opposition that ‘one year later, MacSharry was still
“disappointed and surprised” with these attacks’ (Cunha
& Swinbank, 2011, p. 79). Later, the UK found itself on
the side of CAP reform, but often with a hard-nosed fo-
cus on budget returns, which produced inconstant coali-
tions and made substantive CAP reforms almost impos-
sible. While the liberalizing and greening agenda would
probably have developed without the UK, the UK nev-
ertheless offered a powerful narrative combining liber-
alism and environmentalism and striking illustrations of
the paradigm at home, and it was a persistent advocate
of bringing better regulation to agriculture.
4. Preparing for Brexit: EU Adjustment Strategies
and Narratives
On 29 March 2017, the UK invoked Article 50 of the
Treaty on EU which began the process of its withdrawal
from the EU. This initiation of Brexit took place just
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as the Commission began work as part of its 2017
Work Programme on modernization and simplification
of the CAP. This led to a Communication published in
November 2017 outlining its ideas for the design of the
CAP post 2020 and ultimately to legal proposals pub-
lished in June 2018. However, Brexit has meant that the
UK’s voice in the AGRIFISH Council and, to a lesser ex-
tent, in the Parliament’s agricultural committee on the
substantive negotiations on the Commission’s proposal
has been silent. It has effectively opted out of trying
to influence the course of the negotiations. Brexit also
had an immediate impact on the Commission’s prepara-
tions for the next MFF which it eventually proposed in
May 2018. It means the departure of the second largest
net contributor to the EU budget and thus puts pres-
sure on the otherMember States either tomake savings
in existing policies or to contribute more to the future
EU budget.
The UK is a major net importer of agri-food products
with the bulk of its imports supplied by EU exporters.
Brexit raises the prospect of the re-introduction of tar-
iff and non-tariff barriers on trade between the UK and
the EU27. The UK market will also become less valuable
and more competitive if it adopts its proposed low-tariff
regime for agri-food products (NFU, 2019) and allows
easier access for third country exporters. This will lead to
the displacement of produce previously exported to the
UK to the internal EU market, with potentially adverse
effects on EU market prices and farm incomes. Finally,
the prospect of Brexit has given rise to a vigorous de-
bate within the UK and its constituent countries on the
potential shape of post-Brexit agricultural policy. Some
UK countries are discussing amajor re-orientation of agri-
cultural policy from the traditional emphasis on farm in-
come support to a justification of public support based
on the provision of public goods. If such a reorientation
were to be successfully implemented in one or more UK
countries, it could in turn shift the centre of gravity of
future debates on the CAP. In this section, we examine
how the EU has responded to these threats and their im-
plications for the future of the CAP.
The impact of Brexit on the EU budget is the one
most widely discussed. The UK’s departure leaves a gap
to be filled, estimated at around €13 billion annually in
the coming MFF period compared to anticipated annual
EU budget expenditure of around €170–180 billion. The
gap can be filled either by increased contributions from
the remainingMember States or by reducing the current
level of spending. The Commission proposal sought addi-
tional resources but also proposed savings in existing pro-
grammes including both the CAP and cohesion spending.
It recommended a nominal cut in CAP spending in the
next programming period of between 3–5% compared to
the 2014–2020 MFF, adjusted for the UK’s departure, in
the context of a modest increase in the overall MFF from
1.00% to 1.08% of EU Gross National Income (GNI; 1.11%
when the budgetization of the European Development
Fund is considered). This translates into a cut of around
12% in real terms (Matthews, 2018). The Commission’s
priority was to protect the budget for income support
(European Agricultural Guarantee Fund, financing Pillar 1
expenditure) in nominal terms. All the nominal reduction
will fall on the EuropeanAgricultural Fund on Rural Devel-
opment financing Pillar 2 expenditure, although part of
this reduction will be offset by an increase in the share of
Member State co-financing of rural development expen-
diture by 10 percentage points.
This proposed cut in the CAP budget, even if modest
enough in nominal terms, has been fiercely opposed by
several Member States which have called for an overall
increase in the MFF to allow the level of CAP spending
to be maintained in real terms (Ministers of Agriculture,
2018). The Parliament has also criticized the Commission
proposal and has called for a much larger MFF equal to
1.3% of EU GNI as well as for maintaining the CAP budget
in real terms (EP, 2018). Farm unions have supported this
call, arguing that it was crucial ‘to make sure that farm-
ers do not end up paying the price of Brexit’ (Commit-
tee of Professional Agricultural Organisations—General
Committee for Agricultural Cooperation in the European
Union, 2018). It is not clear if these demands tomaintain
the CAP budget constant in real terms from the agricul-
tural lobbies will be supported by the Finance Ministries
in the Member States. Other Member States have called
for the Commission’s budget proposal to be even further
reduced, including further cuts in CAP spending (Austrian
Presidency, 2018). While the controversy over the size
of the next MFF and the amount of CAP spending is not
all due to Brexit, the UK departure undoubtedly makes
agreement on the next MFF in the European Council
more difficult.
These negotiations on the post-Brexit MFF run par-
allel to the debate on the shape of the CAP after 2020.
The Commission’s proposal is driven partly by a desire
to simplify what all agree has become a hugely complex
policy to administer. Another driver is the need to mod-
ernize the CAP to reflect heightened challenges and new
commitments. These include greater market price uncer-
tainty and a more pessimistic market outlook; the need
to respond to increased market access under free trade
agreements; the need to better harness innovation and
advances in digital technologies both to improve the ac-
curacy and efficiency of the implementation and moni-
toring of CAP instruments as well as their practical appli-
cation in rural areas; and the need to better meet soci-
etal expectations regarding farming and food, including
a greater emphasis in CAP spending on environment and
climate issues.
The proposal’s most innovative element is to move
to a new delivery model entailing greater responsibility
and flexibility for Member States to design their agricul-
tural policies, albeit still within a common EU framework.
Control over Member State interventions would shift
from a compliance framework (are payments to farmers
in compliance with the rules set at EU level for these
payments?) to a performance framework (in which the
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Commission will focus on auditing outcomes based on
achieving agreed performance indicators).
In its legal proposal, the Commission has suggested
a new ‘green architecture’ for the CAP. The current sys-
tem consists of cross-compliance (made up of statutory
minimum requirements and a set of minimum standards
of good agricultural and environmental practice which
all recipients of CAP payments should observe), a green-
ing payment to farmers who observe some simple prac-
tices beneficial to the environment and climate, and vol-
untary AECMs. This will be replaced by a system of en-
hanced conditionality, a new eco-scheme funded as part
of Pillar 1, and voluntary AECMs. Pressure to embed en-
vironmental and climate action even more centrally into
the CAP has moved up the political agenda because the
EU is signed up to, and committed to, action on the Paris
Agreement on climate (translated into EU emission re-
duction goals for 2030 to which agriculture and the land
using sectors must contribute) and the UN SDGs. How-
ever, the bulk of CAP funding will continue to be allo-
cated to area-based direct payment schemes, albeit the
Commission proposes that these should be better tar-
geted on small and medium-sized farms.
The greater emphasis on environmental and climate
ambition and flexibility for Member States to better
mould agricultural policy interventions to meet their
own specific circumstances and needs is closely aligned
to UK preferences in successive CAP reforms as argued
in Section 3. However, there is no evidence that these
proposals are in any way a response to Brexit: the simpli-
fication and modernization drivers were already in play.
However, the UK’s absence from the table as these pro-
posals are negotiated by the co-legislators has weak-
ened the coalition of Member States that support the
Commission’s objective of a more targeted policy and
a greater environmental and climate ambition. At the
time of writing (June 2019), there is evidence that the
Council and Parliament may well end up watering down
some of the more innovative elements in the Commis-
sion proposals, although complications due to the re-
alignment of political groups following Parliament elec-
tions in May 2019, possible delays in agreeing the next
MFF, and potential difficulties in agreeing on the com-
position of the new Commission, could mean that final
decision on the future CAP may be postponed for some
years. At the time of writing (June 2019), the UK is sched-
uled to leave the EU on October 31st 2019. Neither the
Parliament nor Council have yet finalised their negotiat-
ing positions on the three CAP regulations for the post-
2020 period and, as noted above, theUK’s voice has been
largely absent from the debates to formulate these posi-
tions. Trilogues may not get under way until after MFF
conclusions for the 2012–2027 period are agreed by the
European Council, meaning that the UK would no longer
have any say in the future CAP after that point. Of course,
if there were a further extension of the Brexit process be-
yond October 31 2019, the votes of the UK in the Council
and of UKMEPs in the Parliament could still influence the
CAP outcome if the UK is still a Member State when the
votes are finally taken.
Empirical studies of the likely impact of Brexit on EU
agriculturalmarkets suggested only a limited impact, par-
ticularly if the UK remained in a close economic relation-
ship with the EU, with adverse effects concentrated on
a small number of neighbouring Member States and par-
ticularly Ireland (Bellora, Emlinger, Fouré, & Guimbard,
2017). As the prospect of a disorderly Brexit in which
the UK leaves the EU without a withdrawal agreement
(the ‘no-deal’ scenario) increased in the first half of 2019,
more attention focused on the likely adverse market im-
pacts in such a scenario. The UK has indicated that it in-
tends to introduce a highly liberalized tariff schedule in
the event of ‘no-deal’ including zero tariffs on many agri-
food products that are currently protected by the EU’s
common external tariff (NFU, 2019). This will open up
theUKmarket to easier access by third country exporters.
Some tariffs will be maintained for sensitive products
such as beef, lamb and some dairy products but these
will also be applied to UK–EU trade. The Commission has
stepped up its ‘no-deal’ preparedness and has empha-
sized the range of market support instruments at its dis-
posal as well as the opportunities under State aid leg-
islation to assist producers in Member States that may
be particularly adversely affected. Already inMay 2019 a
package of support worth €100million (of which half will
be provided by the EU) was announced for Irish beef pro-
ducers based on evidence of exceptional market distur-
bance arising from the prospect of Brexit. If the range of
crisis mechanisms is not up to the task, post-Brexit mar-
ket chaos could well feed into the narrative demanding a
return to amore interventionist CAPwith greater powers
of market management.
Brexit has also dented the EU’s efforts to portray it-
self as the champion ofmultilateralism in the trade arena
at a time when the US commitment appears to be wan-
ing. Brexit requires the UK to establish its own schedule
of commitments (in terms of tariff bindings, ceilings on
trade-distorting domestic support and tariff rate quota
access) at the WTO. These are currently part of the EU’s
commitments. In particular, the joint UK–EU proposal
to split access under tariff rate quotas according to his-
torical market shares has met with opposition from ex-
porters, who argue that they are disadvantaged by the
division of a unified tariff quota (under which they can
switch supplies between markets in line with relative
profitability) into two separate quotas, albeit of the same
size, where such switching is no longer possible. Affected
exporters point out that the EU does not propose to
make a similar pro rata reduction in the tariff rate quo-
tas it has opened under bilateral free trade agreements.
Brexit could mean that the EU faced an unwanted WTO
dispute that, depending on the outcome, could require
it to open more generous tariff tate quotas than it has so
far planned to do.
In the longer-term, one of the more important im-
pacts of Brexit on the CAP could arise through a ‘demon-
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stration effect’ if some UK countries decide to pursue
their agricultural policy objectives through a radically dif-
ferent set of policy interventions compared to the CAP.
All of the four UK countries have launched consultations
on future agricultural policy. The UK Government has
published an Agriculture Bill that provides the architec-
ture for most of the UK to start to develop their ap-
proaches to supporting farm businesses whilst meeting
future international trading obligations (Scotland is cur-
rently not covered in the Bill because of disagreements
about the overall UK approach to repatriating EU pow-
ers in devolved areas of competence; Coe & Downing,
2018). The UK government has committed to deliver the
same level of funding as currently received under the
CAP (some €4 billion per year) for farm support until the
end of the current parliament, expected in 2022.
Agricultural policy was one of the areas in the UK ref-
erendum debate where Brexit supporters saw potential
gains from ‘taking back control’ through a less burden-
some policy for farmers and reduced agricultural tariffs
lowering prices for consumers (Fresh Start Group, 2016).
These ideas are reflected in the Agriculture Bill and in the
applied tariff schedule that the UK announced in March
2019 it will implement in the event of a ‘no-deal’ Brexit.
This would result in a significant liberalization of import
access for agri-food products. Themain innovation in the
Bill is to give the Secretary of State new powers to pro-
vide financial assistance to those managing the land and
delivering public benefits such as air and water quality,
public access and productivity in England and Wales. To
make way for this system, the Bill provides for the phas-
ing out of direct payments over a seven-year period and
their ‘de-linking’ from any requirement to manage agri-
cultural land during this period. These ‘de-linked’ pay-
ments can be made in a lump sum allowing farmers to
invest in their business, diversify or retire from farming.
The phase out and de-linking of direct payments is not ex-
tended toNorthern Ireland. This ‘publicmoney for public
goods’ approach to future farm support goes much fur-
ther than what the Commission has suggested in its le-
gal proposal for the CAP post 2020, even if both jurisdic-
tions are addressing similar policy objectives. If the UK
countries do proceed with this transition, whether it is
deemed successful or not will have a significant impact
on the CAP debate likely to take place in the next round
of CAP reform towards the end of the 2020’s.
5. Conclusion
Brexit takes place amidst intense political contestation
of the CAP, with a new round of CAP reform and MFF ne-
gotiations pending. Agricultural policy has always been
a lightning rod for UK dissatisfaction with the EU, even
if our analysis shows that the UK found ways to partly
accommodate the policy to its needs. After contesting
the premises of the CAP in the 1970s and 1980s, the
UK settled for a hard-nosed policy of budgetary returns.
Neither contestation nor budgetary returns offered a
constructive alternative, which kept the UK in a marginal
position and prevented it from exploiting the full poten-
tial of a coalition of reform-minded Member States.
The UK leaving the EU opens the possibility that the
dynamics around the CAP in futuremay be different. The
Commission’s legal proposal for the CAP post 2020 is
motivated by new international commitments under the
Paris Agreement and the UN SDGs requiring greater envi-
ronmental and climate ambition, the need to address the
growing revolt by Member States and farmers against
perceived bureaucracy and overly complex administra-
tion, and the recognition that more effort needs to be
put into supporting innovation to avoid EU farming falling
behind in exploiting the opportunities of digital agricul-
ture. These concerns to a large degree reflect UK inter-
ests, although there is no evidence that Brexit influenced
or prompted the reform. Nonetheless, the absence of
a strong voice from the UK in the Council and EP may
weaken the forces supporting the more innovative as-
pects of Commission’s proposal.
The immediate impact of Brexit is the hole it leaves
in the EU budget. It remains unclear whether Member
States will agree to pay in the additional cash to main-
tain current levels of CAP spending or whether the more
hard-nosed policy of the net contributor countries will
prevail. A lower CAP budget is used by those who favour
maintaining the traditional focus of the CAP on support-
ing farm income to argue that farmers cannot afford any
increase in the level of environmental obligations. This in-
direct budgetmechanism could be a furtherway inwhich
Brexit may influence the future shape of the CAP.
Severe market disruption that may follow from a
disorderly Brexit in a ‘no deal’ scenario would also
strengthen the hand of those itching to pull the CAP back
to a more interventionist policy of market management.
On the other hand, the radical ideas to base farm support
on a ‘public payments for public goods’ principle partic-
ularly in England and Wales may have a ‘pull’ effect in
the longer run on the future direction of EU agricultural
policy if it is seen as a successful reform.
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